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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

-v-

Case No. 18038

CHARLES KERMIT LESLEY,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant, Charles Kermit Lesley, was charged with
Production of a Controlled Substance (to wit, cultivation of
marijuana), a felony,
(a)(i)

under Utah Code Ann., § 58-37-8 (1)

(1953), as amended; and with Criminal Trespass, a class

C misdemeanor, under Utah Code Ann., § 76-6-206 (1953), as
amended.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was found guilty of both charges after a
jury trial on August 13 and 17, 1981 in the Third Judicial
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the
Honorable Peter F. Leary, Judge, presiding.

On September 23,

1981, appellant was sentenced to imprisonment at the Utah
State Prison for an indeterminate term not exceeding five
years and fined $900.00 for the felony offense; and was
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

sentenced to imprisonment at the Utah State Prison for an
indeterminate term not exceeding 90 days and fined $299.00 for
the misdemeanor offense--the sentences to run concurrently.

A

stay of execution of the above sentence was granted and
appellant was placed on conditional probation.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming
the judgment and sentence of the trial court.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Red Butte Canyon, located in Salt Lake County a
short distance due east of the University of Utah, is a rugged
area charactrized by steep terrain, dense brush, and a large
population of rattlesnakes (T. 5, 7, 8).

On August 21, 1980,

it was a no-trespass, entry-by-permission-onlyl area
controlled by the United States Forest Service (U.S.F.S.).

A

single road with three locked gates, the first of which
displayed no-trespassing siqns, provided the only access for
vehicles into the canyon.

There were no designated trails for

public use in the area, and people were not commonly seen
there (T. 6, 13, 14, 15, 16).

lAccess to Red Butte Canyon was limited to
u.S.F.S. personnel, persons with permission from the Forest
service (generally, these persons were research workers from
the university of Utah), and 100 deer hunters in October {T.
6)•

-2Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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On that same date, Steve Alexander, a Salt Lake
County deputy sheriff, entered Red Butte Canyon with
approximately ten other officers and Gene Lowin, a forest
technician who had been permanently employed by the U.S.F.S.
for three years and was familiar with the canyon and its use.
Their purpose was to seize marijuana plants and i terns related
to its cultivation in a "farm" compound which had been
detected in the area and investigated at an earlier date (T.

4, 9, 26, 27).

At a distance of approximately one-quarter

mile, Officer Alexander observed appellant walking in the
immediate area of the compound.

Shortly thereafter, Alexander

arrived at the compound and found appellant nearby (T. 29, 30)
(no other individuals were found {T. 12, 57)).

After asking

appellant for some identification and to explain his presence
in the area, and having been informed by Gene Lowin that
appellant was trespassing, Officer Alexander placed appellant
under arrest (T. 53).2

Several items of evidence were

seized during a search of appellant and his pack conducted
pursuant to the arrest ( T. 31-45).
On February 6, 1981, appellant filed a pre-trial
motion in the district court, Judge Jay Banks, presiding, to

2rt should be noted that Alexander's testimony at
trial indicated that he didn't recall exactly whether, before
he arrested appellant, he had asked for identification and an
explanation of appellant's presence in the area.
However, his
testimony did indicate that he had been informed by Lowin of
appellant's trespasser status before the arrest was made (T.
31, 53).
-3-
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suppress the evidence seized from his pack.

His memorandum in

support of that motion asserted that Officer Alexander did not
have probable cause to arrest him, and thus the evidence
seized should not be admissible at trial (R. 12-18).
district court denied the motion.

The

During his trial on August

14 and 17, 1981, at which Judge Peter Leary presided,
appellant raised no objection to the admission of that
evidence or of any other evidence offered by the prosecution
(T. 88, 100).

The jury found him guilty of both criminal

trespass and production of a controlled substance (R. 41, 42).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED PURSUANT TO A SEARCH
INCIDENT TO APPELLANT'S ARREST WAS
PROPERLY ADMITTED AT TRIAL.
A.

BECAUSE APPELLANT FAILED TO OBJECT AT
TRIAL TO THE ADMISSION OF THE EVIDENCE
NOW CHALLENGED ON APPEAL, HE IS
PRECLUDED FROM RAISING THE ISSUE ON
APPEAL.

Although appellant filed a pre-trial motion to
suppress the evidence seized from his pack pursuant to a
search conducted after his arrest, the admission of which he
now challenges on appeal, he failed to raise an objection at
trial; thus, the issue was not preserved for consideration on
appeal.

In fact, the record indicates that appellant
-4-
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consented to admission of the evidence.

At T. 88, the

following dialogue appears:
Mr. Christensen (Prosecutor):
At this
time, your Honor, I believe that Mr. Long
has had a chance to review the exhibits
and I would offer Exhibits 1-P through and
i nc 1 u ai ng 3 5- p • 3
The Court:
Have you examined the
photographs?
Mr. Long (Appellant's attorney):
I have,
your Honor.
I have no objection to the
introduction of them in evidence.
The Court:
admitted.

Exhibits 1 through 35 will be

Rule 4, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides:
A verdict or finding shall not be set
aside, nor shall the judgment or decision
based thereon be reversed, by reason of
the erroneous admission of evidence unless
(a) there appears of record objection to
the evidence timely interposed and so
stated as to make clear the specific
ground of objection, and (b) the court
which passes upon the effect of the error
or errors is of the opinion that the
admitted evidence should have been
excluded on the ground stated anq probably
had a substantial influence in bringing
about the verdict or finding.
However,
the court in its discretion, and in the
interests of justice, may review the
erroneous admission of evidence even
though the grounds of the objection
thereto are not correctly stated.

3Exhibits 1-P through 35-P included the evidence
seized from appellant's pack.
-5-
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Recently,

in State v. Mccardell, Utah, 652 P.2d 942

(1982), this Court made clear what effect a defendant's
failure to comply with the "contemporaneous objection"
requirements of Rule 4 would have on assignments of error made
on appeal.

In holding that McCardell's failure to interpose a

timely and specific objection to the admission of several "mug
shots" precluded consideration on appeal of his arguments
respecting that issue (even though his "arguments on [that]
point clearly ha[d] merit," 652 P.2d at 946), the Court said:
We endorse the following statement made by
the Kansas Supreme Court in [State v.
Moore, 218 Kan. 450, 543 P.2d 923 (1975)]:
"The contemporaneous objection rule long
adhered to in this state requires timely
and specific objection to admission of
evidence in order for the question of
admissibility to be considered on appeal.
The rule is a salutory procedural tool
serving a legitimate state purpose.
By
making use of the rule, counsel gives the
trial court the opportunity to conduct the
trial without using the tainted evidence,
and thus avoid possible reversal and a new
trial.
Furthermore, the rule is
practically one of necessity if litigation
is ever to be brought to an end."
543 P.2d at 927, quoting Baker v. State,
204 Kan. 607, 611, 464 P.2d 212, 216
(1970).
652 P.2d at 947.

See also:

401 P.2d 445 (1965).

State v. Smith, 16 Utah 2d 374,

The same considerations apply here.

Thus, appellant's failure to interpose any objection, which
thereby denied the trial court an opportunity to address his
-6-
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concerns, should have the same consequences such inexcusable
procedural default had in State v. Mccardell, supra--a refusal
by this Court to consider the evidence issue on appeal.

As

Justice Powell stated in Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501
(1976),
[T] here are two situations in which a
conviction should be left standing despite
the claimed infringement of a
constitutional right. The first situation
arises when it can be shown that the
substantive right in question was
consensually relinquished.
The other
situation arises when a defendant has made
an "inexcusable procedural default" in
failing to object at a time when a
substantive right could have been
protected.
Id. at 513-514 {concurring opinion)

(emphasis added).

A further issue must also be addressed.

Utah Code

Ann., § 77-35-12 (1980) provides for the filing of pre-trial
motions to suppress evidence, like that which was filed in
appellant's case.

There is a split of authority concerning

the issue of whether a defendant whose pre-trial motion to
suppress has been denied must again raise an objection to the
evidence at trial in order to preserve the issue for appeal.
However, given the policy considerations expressed by this
Court in State v. Mccardell, supra, and State v. Smith, supra,
the following rule as stated by the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals in Romo v. State, Tex. Cr. App., 577 S.W.2d 251 {1978)
-7-
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is most consistent with those considerations and should be
adopted in Utah:
[R]eliance on a motion in limine will not
preserve error.
A defendant must object
on the proper grounds when the evidence is
offered at trial.
Harrington v. State,
547 S.W.2d 643 (Tex.Cr.App. 1976).
The
reason for this rule is that a judge is
often not in a position to necide on the
admissibility of evidence prior to the
beginning of trial.
This is particularly
true when the objection is based on
grounds such as the failure to prove a
proper predicate.
Counsel could ask in
the motion in limine that before a suspect
area is entered into at trial, the
opposing counsel be required to approach
the bench.and inform the court so that the
jury may be excluded.
By that procedure
the evidence may be challenged at the
proper time without risk of prejudicing
the jury. Whatever the procedure chosen,
defense counsel must object before the
evidence is admitted during trial in order
to properly call the court's attention to
the matter and preserve the error for
appeal.
577 S.W.3d at 252.

See also:

State v. Hinsey, Iowa, 200

N.W.2d 810 (1972); Jackson v. State, 108 Ga. App. 529, 133
S.E.2d 436 (1963).

However, cf. United States v. Hopkins, 433

F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1970) and Sacramento and San Joaquin
Drainage Dist. v. Reed, 215 Cal. App. 2d 60,

29 Cal. Rptr. 847

{1963), which are contra.
The above rule is particularly applicable where, as
here, the judge ruling on the pre-trial motion to suppress is
not the same judge who presides at trial.

By failing to

-8Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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object, appellant denied the trial judge an opportunity to
consider appellant's arguments against admission of the
evidence; and, in fact, gave the trial judge the impression
that he consented to its admission after being specifically
asked if he had any objections (T. 88).

Given these facts,

appellant has absolutely no grounds to appeal.

B.

OFFICER ALEXANDER HAD PROBABLE CAUSE
TO ARREST APPELLANT; THUS, THE
EVIDENCE SEIZED WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED
AT TRIAL.

Even if this Court decides to consider the evidence
issue, appellant's assignment of error is without merit.
Appellant argues that unner the circumstances of his case, his
arrest was made without probable cause, was therefore illegal,
and the evidence obtained pursuant to a search incident to
that arrest should have been suppressed prior to trial.

In

short, his suppression argument is based solely on the alleged
illegality of the arrest.
Appellant correctly notes that the Utah Supreme
Court has adopted the Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964),
standard concerning what constitutes probable cause for arrest
without a warrant.

State v. Whittenback, Utah, 621 P.2d 103

(1980); See also:

State v. Hatcher, 27 Utah 2d 318, 495 P.2d

1259 (1972).

In Whittenback, this Court affirmed the Beck

standard as follows:
-9-
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The determination should be made on an
objective standara: whether from the
facts known to the officer and the
inferences which fairly might be drawn
therefrom, a reasonable and prudent person
in his position would be justified in
believing that the suspect had committed
the offense.
621 P.2d at 106, citing State v. Hatcher, supra.

As also

noted by appellant, this same basic standard is reflected in
Utah Code Ann., § 77-7-2 (1980).

Subsection (3) of that

section provides that a peace officer may make an arrest
without a warrant:
When he has reasonable cause to
believe the person has committed a public
offense, and there is reasonable cause for
believing the person may:
(a) Flee or conceal himself to avoid
arrest;
(b) Destroy or conceal evidence of the
commission of the offense; or
(c) Injure another person or damage
property belonging to another person.
In State v. Eastmond, 28 Utah 2d 129, 499 P.2d 276 (1972),
this Court interpreted the language of subsection (3) as
follows:
In performing his duties as
authorized by this statute, a police
officer is not required to meet anv such
standard of perfection as to demand an
absolutely certain judgment before he may
act.
The test to be applied is one which
is reasonable and practical under the
circumstances:
whether a reasonable and
prudent man in his position would be
-10-
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justified in believing facts which would
warrant making the arrest.
In ruling on
the anmissibility of eviaence so obtained,
the questions as to the validity of the
arrest and the justification for anv
search made in connection therewith~are
primarily for the trial court to
determine; and on appeal we respect that
prerogative and do not upset his
determination unless it clearly appears
that he was in error.
499 P.2d at 278 (footnote omitted); cited in State v. Elliott,
Utah, 626 P.2d 423, 427 (1981).4
Officer Alexander sighted and later engaged
appellant in the immediate vicinity of the "marijuana
compound" in Red Butte Canyon--an extremely rugged area posted
no trespassing, containing no trails designated for public
use, having but one access road with three locked gates (the
first of which displayed no-trespassing signs), and where
people were not commonly seen.

Before arresting appellant,

Officer Alexander had been advised by Gene Lowin, a U.S.F.S.
employee who had knowledge of and responsibilities concerning
the canyon, that appellant was trespassing (as noted in the
statement of facts, he may also have asked appellant for
identification and an explanation of appellant's presence in
the area).

Given the totality of the facts known to Alexander

4At the time of the Eastmond decision, the
provisions of § 77-7-2 were contained in § 77-13-3.
-11-
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and the inferences he might fairly have drawn therefrom (i.e.,
that appellant most probably had seen the no-trespassing signs
conspicuously posted at the entrance to the area's only access
road or had encountered the locked gates along that road, and
therefore knew that his entry and presence was unlawful; that
appellant was not a deer hunter who had permission to be in
the area (in that it was not yet hunting season); and that
appellant did not otherwise have permission to be in the area
based on the information received from the U.S.F.S. employee
who was present at the scene of appellant's apprehension),
under the standards set forth in State v. Whittenback, supra,
and State v. Eastmond, supra, he had probable cause to arrest
appellant for criminal trespass as it is defined in Utah Code
Ann.,§ 76-6-206(2}(b), which provides that a person is guilty
of criminal trespass under circumstances not amounting to
burglary when:
Knowing his entrv or presence is unlawful,
he enters or remains on property as to
which notice against entering is given by:
(ii) Fencing or other enclosure obviously
designed to exclude intruders; or
(iii) Posting of signs reasonably likely
to come to the attention of intruders.
Hence, appellant's arrest was legal and the evidence obtained
pursuant to a search incident to that arrest was properly
admitted at trial.

-12-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN INSTRUCTING
THE JURY ON THE ELEMENTS OF CRIMINAL
TRESPASS.
Appellant argues that although he failed to comply
with Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, by not objecting
at trial to the jury instruction he now challenges on appeal,
this Court, nevertheless, should consider his assignment of
error under Utah Code Ann., § 77-35-19(c)

(1980).

In State v.

Kazda, Utah, 545 P.2d 190 (1976), this Court explained the
purpose and meaning of Rule Sl's requirement that "[n]o party
may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an
instruction unless he objects thereto":
There is an important purpose to be served
by the rule requiring that objections be
made to the instructions.
It gives an
opportunity for the court to correct, or
to fill in any inadequacy in the
instructions, so that the jury may
consider the case on a proper basis.
In
order to accomplish that purpose, the rule
should be adhered to.
Accordingly, the
standard rule is that when a party faITs
to make a proper objection to an erroneous
instruction, or to present to the court a
proper request to supply any claimed
deficiency in the instructions, he is
thereafter precluded from contending
error.
Id. at 192, 193 (footnote omitted)

(emphasis added).

See

also: State v. Valdez, Utah, 604 P.2d 472 (1979); State v.
Pierren, Utah, 583 P.2d 69 (1978); State v. Erickson, Utah,
-13-
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568 P.2d 750 (1977).

Because appellant, by his own admission,

failed to object to the jury instruction in the trial court,
he should be precluded from doing so here.
However, even if this Court is inclined to consider
appellant's assignment of error in order to avoid manifest
injustice under

§

77-35-19(c) {1980), there was simply no

error concerning the instructions given; and thus, as was the
case in State v. Malmrose, Utah, 649 P.2d 56 {1982) {cited by
appellant), appellant makes no showing of injustice.
also:

See

Kazda, supra; State v. Schoenfeld, Utah, 545 P.2d 193

{1976).
Appellant contends that it would be manifestly
unjust to sustain his conviction based on what he alleges was
a "poorly drafted information whose language was erroneously
duplicated in the trial court's instructions to the jury"
(Appellant's Brief, p. 9).

He claims Instruction No. 12

erroneously combined the elements of burglary and criminal
trespass, failing to include the full requirements of either.
That instruction read in part:
Before you can convict the defendant
of the crime of Criminal Trespass, Count
II, you must find from the evidence,
beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the
following elements of that crime:
1.
That on or about the 21st day of
August, 1980, in Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, the defendant, Charles Kermit
Lesley, unlawfully entered the property of
the U.S. Government.

-14Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2.
That at the time of said entrv the
defendant, Charles Kermit Lesley,-intenaea
to commit the crime of Production Of A
Controlled Substance.
R. 60).

According to appellant, Utah Code Ann., § 76-6206(2) (a) (ii)

(1953), as amended, requires that the accused

must intend to commit a crime that is not a felony in order to
be guilty of criminal trespass; and because felonious intent
is an element of burglary but not of criminal trespass, to
instruct the jury that it must find that appellant intended to
commit the crime of production of a controlled substance (a
felony) frustrates the intent of the criminal trespass
statute.

Appellant even goes so far as to suggest that the

state should have charged him with burglary and not criminal
trespass.

These arguments result from a combination of clever

manipulation of the language contained in the criminal
trespass statute and a misreading of the burglary statute.
Utah's burglary statute, Utah Code Ann., § 76-6-202
(1953), as amended, reads in part:
(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he
enters or remains unlawfully in a building
or any portion of a building with intent
to commit a felony or theft or commit an
assault on any person (emphasis added).
Section 7 6- 6- 20 6 ( 2) (a) (ii), the port ion of Utah's criminal
trespass statute at issue here, reads:
A person is guilty of criminal trespass
if, under circumstances not amounting to
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burglary as defined in sections 76-6-202,
76-6-203, or 76-6-204
(a) He enters or remains unlawfully on
property and:
(ii) Intends to commit any crime, other
than theft or a felony.
First, because appellant did not enter or remain
unlawfully in a building or a portion thereof (under the
definition of "building" in Utah Code Ann., § 76-6-201(1)
(1953), as amended), he clearly could not have been charged
with burglary.

Therefore, appellant's suggestion concerning a

charge of burglary is entirely without merit.
Second, appellant's interpretation of § 76-6-206(2)
(a)(ii) would lead to a rather illogical result:

An

individual who entered or remained unlawfully on property,
other than a building, and who intended to commit "any crime,
other than theft or a felony," would be guilty of criminal
trespass; yet an individual under the same circumstances who
intended to commit a felony would be guilty of no crime.
Legislature could not have intended such a result.

The

The words

"other than theft or a felony" simply are mitigating with
respect to burglary in that if a person enters or remains
unlawfully in a building and intends to commit a crime other
than theft or a felony, that person is guilty only of criminal
trespass.

Those words are not exclusive with respect to

criminal trespass, and cannot reasonably be read to render
appellant immune from

prose~ution

under§ 76-6-206(2)(a)(ii).

-16Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In the construction of a statute, the Court must be
controlled by the evident purpose of the Legislature to attain
a certain ena.
(1933).

State v. Navaro, 83 Utah 6, 26 P.2d 955

In short, the fundamental question which transcends

all others is what was the intent of the Legislature.

Johnson

v. Tax Commission, 17 Utah 2d 37, 411 P.2d 831 {1966).
Insuring proper effect to legislative intent and purpose is a
primary consideration.

Parson Asphalt Production, Inc. v.

Utah State Tax Commission, Utah, 617 P.2d 397 (1980); Millett
v. Clark Clinic Corp., Utah, 609 P.2d 934 (1980).

A statute

should not be construed or applied so as to produce
incongruous results which were never intended.
Clune, 15 Utah 2d 254, 390 P.2d 915 (1964).
§

Snyder v.

Accordingly,

76-6-206(2)(a)(ii) is most reasonably construed as applying

to appellant, who unlawfully entered the property of the
United States Government with the intent to commit a felony.
The trial court's Instruction No. 12 was therefore correctly
given.
POINT III
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL WAS
PROPERLY DENIED.
Finally, appellant contends that the trial court
abused its discretion in not dismissing a juror who apparently
was having some difficulty staying awake during the first day
-17-
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of appellant's trial; and that this denied him the right to a
fair trial.

Both of the cases cited by appellant in support

of his position, United States v. Cameron, 464 F.2d 333 (3rd
Cir. 1972); and People v. Dupont, New York, 444 N.Y.S.2d 40
(1981), indicate that the disqualified jurors therein were
grossly inattentive (e.g., the juror in Cameron had been
asleep at least 50 percent of the time during trial).
Appellant has not shown that this was the situation here.

He

merely quotes a brief exchange between the trial judge and Mr.
Kilpack, the juror, which indicates the judge's concern about
Kilpack's ability to remain awake (T. 101).

Concern for a

sleepy juror was not indicated by any of the parties at any
other time during the trial.

It should also be noted that the

trial court decided to recess for the day when it became aware
of Mr. Kilpack's difficulty--a reasonable, discretionary
response to the problem, which quite obviously protected
appellant's right to a fair trial.
In State v. Pace, Utah, 527 P.2d 658 (1974), this
Court addressed a similar claim that the trial court erred in
not declaring a mistrial because of inattentiveness or
drowsiness of jurors.

Justice Henriod, writing for a

unanimous Court, said:
Two onlookers said two of the jurors
consciously went to sleep.
The trial
judge, not charged with somnambulism, in
denying the motion for mistrial, said that
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he had observea the whole jury; that one
had not gone to sleep, and the other <lid
"doze-for a second, twice" but had aroused
before he, (the judge) "had a chance to
call it to her, (the juror's) attention."
Hence there seems to have been nothing in
the eyes of the beholder, nor in the arms
of Morpheus reflecting that the juror
could have been ensconced, so as to have
stupefied the veniremen, or the sound
discretion of the trial judge.
527 P.2d at 659 (footnotes omitted).
The trial judge in appellant's case was in a favored
position for observation of the juror, Mr. Kilpack; and the
exercise of his discretionary judgment denying appellant's
motion for a mistrial should not be disturbed on appeal, just
as this Court did not disturb the trial judge's discretion in
State v. Pace, supra.

See also:

People v. Hanes, Colo. App.

596 P.2d 395 (1978), affirmed, 598 P.2d 131 (1979), citing
State v. Pace, supra.

In short, appellant has made no showing

that the trial court's action denied him the right to a fair
trial.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, respondent
respectfully submits that the trial court's judgment and
sentence respecting both the charge of production of a
controlled substance and the charge of criminal trespass
should be affirmed.
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Respectfully submitted this 24th day of January,
1983.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and exact
copies of the foregoing Brief, postage prepaid, to Ronald J.
Yengich, Attorney for Appellant, 44 Exchange Place, Salt Lake
City, Utah, 84111, this 24th day of January, 1983.
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